Multiple-Layer Candidate Sieves Against Serial Cryptographic Implementations

15 pages•Published: October 3, 2022

Changhai Ou, Fan Zhang, Xinping Zhou, Kexin Qiao and Renjun Zhang

Abstract

The existing multiple-layer candidate sieve exploits collisions to filter the candidates to achieve a much smaller space for easier key recovery, and tries to recover the key ranking at very deep candidate space. However, it leads to enormous computation yet achieves very low success probability. In this paper, we build a novel Simple Multiple-Layer Sieve (SMLS) from Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) and achieve better performance than the existing one. Furthermore, we build two combined sieves named Two-Layer Stacking Sieve (TLSS) and Full-Layer Stacking Sieve (FLSS) since same operations in serial cryptographic implementation generate similar leakage. The experimental results verify their superiority.

Keyphrases: flss, multiple layer sieve, serial implementation, side channel attack, smls, stacking attack, tlss

In: Ulrich Kühne and Fan Zhang (editors). Proceedings of 10th International Workshop on Security Proofs for Embedded Systems, vol 87, pages 34-48.

Links:	https://easychair.org/publications/paper/wqtL
	https://doi.org/10.29007/d3gt

BibTeX entry

@inproceedings{PROOFS2021:Multiple_Layer_Candidate_Sieves,
  author    = {Changhai Ou and Fan Zhang and Xinping Zhou and Kexin Qiao and Renjun Zhang},
  title     = {Multiple-Layer Candidate Sieves Against Serial Cryptographic Implementations},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of 10th International Workshop on Security Proofs for Embedded Systems},
  editor    = {Ulrich Kühne and Fan Zhang},
  series    = {EPiC Series in Computing},
  volume    = {87},
  publisher = {EasyChair},
  bibsource = {EasyChair, https://easychair.org},
  issn      = {2398-7340},
  url       = {/publications/paper/wqtL},
  doi       = {10.29007/d3gt},
  pages     = {34-48},
  year      = {2022}}

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