STELLAR: A Generic EM Side-Channel Attack Protection through Ground-Up Root-cause Analysis

EasyChair Preprint 839

Abstract

The threat of side-channels is becoming increasingly prominent for resource-constrained internet-connected devices. While numerous power side-channel countermeasures have been proposed, a promising approach to protect the non-invasive electromagnetic side-channel attacks has been relatively scarce. Today's availability of high-resolution electromagnetic (EM) probes mandates the need for a low-overhead solution to protect EM side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks. This work, for the first time, performs a white-box analysis to root-cause the origin of the EM leakage from an integrated circuit. System-level EM simulations with Intel 32 nm CMOS technology interconnect stack, as an example, reveals that the EM leakage from metals above layer 8 can be detected by an external non-invasive attacker with the commercially available state-of-the-art EM probes. Equipped with this 'white-box' understanding, this work proposes STELLAR: Signature aTtenuation Embedded CRYPTO with Low-Level metAl Routing, which is a two-stage solution to eliminate the critical signal radiation from the higher-level metal layers. Firstly, we propose routing of the entire cryptographic cores power traces using the local lower-level metal layers, whose leakage cannot be picked up by an external attacker. Then, the entire crypto IP is embedded within a Signature Attenuation Hardware (SAH) which in turn suppresses the critical encryption signature before it routes the current signature to the highly radiating top-level metal layers. System-level implementation of the STELLAR hardware with local lower-level metal routing in TSMC 65 nm CMOS technology, with an AES-128 encryption engine (as an example cryptographic block) operating at 40 MHz, shows that the system remains secure against EM SCA attack even after 1 M encryptions, with 67% energy-efficiency compared to the unprotected AES.

Keyphrases: EM Side-channel attack, Generic countermeasure, Ground-up EM Leakage Modeling, STELLAR, Signature Attenuation Hardware, cryptographic hardware

@booklet{EasyChair:839,
  author    = {Debayan Das and Mayukh Nath and Baibhab Chatterjee and Santosh Ghosh and Shreyas Sen},
  title     = {STELLAR: A Generic EM Side-Channel Attack Protection through Ground-Up Root-cause Analysis},
  doi       = {10.29007/ptmg},
  howpublished = {EasyChair Preprint 839},
  year      = {EasyChair, 2019}}